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Abstract We estimate popularity functions for the Austrian parties Austrian People’s
Party (ÖVP), Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Austrian Freedom party (FPÖ) between
1987 and 2010 (using annual data) as well as vote functions for the same Austrian
parties in the 86 election districts in the national elections in 1999, 2002, 2006 and
2008. In most cases we find a statistically significant and theoretically predicted
influence of three economic variables, namely the unemployment rate, inflation rate
and growth rate of income, on both popularity and voting behavior. However, this
influence is not robust and shows a tendency to decline over time.
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Introduction
In the 1970s and 1980s there was a first wave of popularity and vote functions, which
were estimated for almost all highly developed OECD countries.1 In the last 10 years
these functions have enjoyed a certain revival, with studies for Germany (Kirchgässner
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1Compare e.g. Lewis-Beck (1988), Nannestad and Paldam (1994), Paldam (2004), Kirchgässner (2009).
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2009) and Denmark (Paldam 2004) revealing new, and quite surprising, findings: The
economic situation has much less influence on popularity than in the first wave of
studies, where the majority of investigations showed a statistically highly significant
and quantitatively important effect of the unemployment rate, the rate of inflation and
the growth rate of income on popularity or on the outcomes of elections. In this paper
an attempt is made to undertake an empirical investigation exploring the extent to
which the economic situation influences the popularity of Austrian parties. Addition-
ally, our study is a first attempt to estimate the influence of the economic situation on
outcomes in the 86 election districts in the federal elections in 1999, 2002, 2006 and
2008. We find that the influence of the economic situation is mixed, becoming less
important the more recent the elections are.
Theoretical Considerations
In this section, we provide some theoretical considerations and a short literature review.2
Voting and popularity models analyze the relationship between economic and political
variables and support for a country’s government. According to Nannestad and Paldam
(1994) and Paldam (2004), about 300 papers on vote and popularity functions were
written from around 1970 onwards. Most of this research is empirical in nature, and one
general finding is that, according to Downs’ theory, selfish politicians’ and voters’
behavior can be reduced to the operational idea known as the responsibility hypothesis,
meaning that voters hold governments responsible for the past performance of the
economy. This hypothesis predicts that if the economy is doing well, voters will approve
of this and the popularity or election outcomes of the governing party (or parties) will
increase. Likewise, if the economy is in bad shape, the popularity or election outcomes
of these parties will sink.
Most authors choose a linear functional relationship to model the vote and popularity
function, and in most cases three economic variables, namely the unemployment rate,
inflation rate and growth rate of personal disposable income, are used. This is also the
case for this paper; hence, we model the popularity and vote function as follows:
POP‐Austria Party‐A or Electionf
Outcome Party‐Ag ¼ F
unemployment rate UEQ; rate of inflation RI ; growthf
rate of personal income RPI ; and other variablesg
The theoretically expected signs are UEQ<0, RI<0 and RPI>0.3
The facts about the empirical results of vote and popularity functions over the period
1970 to 1990 can be summarized as follows: Most of the empirical findings derive from
estimates built upon the responsibility hypothesis. This hypothesis offers a simple and
reduced link between the economy and the voter. A second important finding is that the
vote and popularity functions do not produce very stable results. Third, it is difficult to
2 There is a huge body of literature on the theory of voting which will not be discussed in this paper. We will
only provide some theoretical considerations and the latest empirical results. For example, compare the
excellent surveys by Paldam (1981, 2004) and Nannestad and Paldam (1994). See also the earlier survey
by Schneider and Frey (1988).
3 In this paper, we do not discuss whether, from an economic or public choice standpoint, it is rational to vote
at all and whether voters act as rational agents with a forward-looking perspective (compare Paldam (2004)).
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compare the results from the various authors and for different countries because almost
every author has his or her own specifications.
One more recent empirical study was undertaken by Kirchgässner (2009),
who argued that increasing unemployment and inflation had mostly had a
negative impact on a government’s popularity. This was true for Germany as
well. These variables had the predicted negative influence on the popularity of
the governments of Adenauer, Erhard, Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl and were
statistically highly significant. However, this result does not hold for Schröder’s
government (1998–2005). Neither unemployment nor inflation had a statistically
significant influence on its popularity. Kirchgässner argues that the missing
impact of unemployment might be due to statistical reasons, namely the short
observation period and low variance in the explanatory variables. As for
inflation, the voters might have realized that they could no longer hold the
government responsible for this phenomenon as the European Central Bank
(ECB) had been in charge of monetary policy in Europe since 1999. Although
Kirchgässner found no significant influence of the macroeconomic variables on
the popularity of Schröder’s government, he believed that it was much too early
to draw the general conclusion that voters do not hold governments responsible
for economic developments because more and better data would be needed to
undertake further investigations to confirm such an assumption.
The only studies dealing with the Austrian situation are those by Neck
(1979, 1988, 1996), Hofreither (1988) and Neck and Karbuz (1995, 1997).
Their main results are as follows: the rate of unemployment, the growth rate
of disposable income and the rate of inflation were identified as economic
determinants of voters’ evaluation of political parties. They found evidence
for a structural break in the popularity functions related to the change from a
one-party or small coalition government to a “grand” coalition (a coalition of
the big parties SPÖ and ÖVP). For a one-party government or a small coali-
tion, the predictions of the responsibility hypothesis were confirmed for the
popularity functions. However, these results were not very stable. In some cases
they had the expected coefficient and sign predicted by theory, while in other
cases they did not. In the next section, the econometric results of the popularity
and vote functions are presented.
Empirical Results
Some Remarks About the Austrian Political System
Austria is a representative democracy in which parliamentary elections took place
(at least) every four years until 2008 and then (at least) every five years. At the
federal level, there is a clear distinction between the opposition and the govern-
ment, and in most periods the government was formed either by a “grand”
coalition between the two biggest parties, the SPÖ and the ÖVP, or by a coalition
consisting of one big party with a “minor” partner, the FPÖ. A single party has
not had a majority in parliament since the early 1980s and even before then it was
quite rare.
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Results of the Popularity Function in Austria
First, the estimation results for the popularity functions are presented for the Austrian
parties at the federal level. Due to data restrictions and the switching of the two big
parties between government and opposition, we only investigate these functions over
the time period 1987 to 2010, adding up to 24 annual observations. Here we have the
situation that only the People’s Party (VP) was in government continuously, either as a
junior partner or as a senior one. As a junior partner of the Social Democrats (SP), they
governed from 1987 to 1999 and from 2007 to 2010. As a senior partner, the People’s
Party governed together with the Freedom Party (FP) from 2000 to 2006. For the
Social Democrats and the Freedom Party, the empirical investigation is more difficult
because they both switched between government and opposition within this period, but
at least the People’s Party was in power all of the time.
In Table 1, the estimation results of the popularity functions of the Austrian parties at
the federal level are shown over the period 1987–2010.4 Taking into consideration that
the People’s Party was the dominating force from 2000 to 2006 and that the chancellor
came from this party, we model this with a dummy variable DYV (=1 over the period
2000 to 2006, otherwise=0).
In the econometric results of the People’s Party, the chancellor dummy variable has a
statistically significant influence, raising the popularity of the People’s Party by 3.2
percentage points. The unemployment rate, inflation rate and growth rate of disposable
income have the predicted signs, but only the unemployment variable is statistically
significant, and only if the income variable is omitted. If the rate of unemployment rises
by one percentage point, the popularity of the People’s Party drops by 0.81 percentage
points. For the Social Democratic Party and the Freedom Party, the economic variables
have no statistically significant influence and the popularity of the Freedom Party
incurs a severe drop when taking the chancellor dummy variable for the People’s Party
into account. The Freedom Party loses 6.1 percentage points over this time period, and
this influence is statistically highly significant. Otherwise, none of the economic
variables is statistically significant, which is not surprising as these parties were partly
in government and partly in opposition in the period concerned.
Due to the switching of the SPÖ and the FPÖ between government and opposition,
an attempt was made to split the economic variables into two periods, one from 1987 to
1999 and 2007 to 2010 and the other from 2000 to 2006. This reflects the fact that the
economic variables have a different influence when a party is in opposition compared
to the situation when it is in government. The results are shown in Table 2, with all
three economic variables in part 1 and with only inflation and unemployment as
explanatory variables in part 2.
Considering Table 2 part 1, at first glance the results are better than in Table 1 but are
still quite mixed. If we first turn to the People’s Party, we realize that the estimated
coefficients for the unemployment rate have the negative signs as predicted theoreti-
cally but are only statistically significant for the periods 1987–1999 and 2007–2010. If
4 To estimate the popularity functions using time series data, we use the generalized least squares (GLS)
method with a Prais-Winsten transformation. This transformation controls for serial correlation and accounts
for the first observation, which would otherwise be lost. In doing so, we obtain efficient results for an
autoregressive process of order one. This estimator is also known as the Yule-Walker estimator. All regressions
are iterated multiple times and converge according to a default threshold (Sargan 1964).
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the rate of unemployment rose by one percentage point, the People’s Party lost 1.66
percentage points of popularity. We also obtain the predicted negative sign for the
inflation rate, but it is statistically significant only for the period 2000–2006, with a
quantitatively important coefficient. If inflation rose by one percentage point, the
People’s Party lost 2.72 percentage points in popularity. The growth rate of disposable
income has no statistically significant influence.
Considering the Social Democratic Party, the split of the three economic
variables yields the signs predicted by the theory. When the Social Democrats
were in opposition over the period 2000–2006, an increase in unemployment
helped them to gain popularity. If the unemployment rate rose by one percentage
point, the Social Democratic Party gained 1.7 to 2.2 percentage points. The
growth rate of disposable income also has the predicted negative sign and is
statistically highly significant for the period when this party was in opposition.
If the growth rate of income rose by one percentage point during the period 2000–
2006, the Social Democratic Party lost between one and 0.75 percentage points.
For the second period (1987 to 1999 and 2007 to 2010), in which the Social
Democrats were in government, if the growth rate of disposable income increased
by one percentage point, the Social Democratic Party gained 0.53 percentage
points. Considering the Freedom Party, which was in government from 2000–
2006, we get a positive influence of the inflation rate, contrary to theoretical
predictions. None of the other coefficients is statistically significant. Neither is the
chancellor variable statistically significant when the economic variables are split.
Now let us turn to the results of the popularity function at the federal level using the
unemployment rate and the inflation rate as explanatory variables only, as shown in
Table 2, part 2. Here we do not find different results for the People’s Party and the
Social Democratic Party. However, the Freedom Party has the expected negative
influence of the unemployment rate when this party was in government in 2000–
2006 and a positive influence of the unemployment rate when this party was in
opposition. During its time in government, the Freedom Party lost 4.8 percentage
points if the rate of unemployment rose by one percentage point, and it gained 2.7%
in the same situation during its time in opposition. The Freedom Party also gained from
rising inflation, namely between 1.7 and 4.6 percentage points, a result that is not in
accordance with theoretical predictions as the Freedom Party was in government during
this time. Summarizing the results of Tables 1 and 2, part 1 and part 2, we gain the
overall impression that economic variables have some influence on the popularity of
the Austrian parties at the federal level, but in general the influence is quite weak and
not very robust.
Results of the Vote Function
The influence of the state of the economy on the election outcome of single parties was
investigated for the national elections in 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2008 in the 86 election
districts at the federal level. The People’s Party was in government for all four elections
and was the dominant party (with the federal chancellor) for the elections in 2002 and
2006. In the two remaining elections (1999 and 2008), the Social Democrats were the
dominant government party. In our empirical study, the four elections are investigated
separately for the People’s Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Freedom Party.
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In Table 3, the results of the elections are presented for the People’s Party for these
four elections. Consider first the results presented in the respective first line (without the
lagged endogenous variable). With one exception the two economic variables have the
predicted signs, but their statistical significance varies over the four elections. If we first
turn to the unemployment rate, it had no statistically significant influence on the 1999
elections for the People’s Party but a statistically significant influence on the results of
the remaining three elections (2002, 2006 and 2008). If the rate of unemployment
increased by one percentage point, the People’s Party lost 1.2, 1.4 and 1.0 percentage
points in the elections in 2002, 2006 and 2008 respectively. If we turn to the growth rate
of disposable income, we have a statistically significant influence in all four cases, but
for the last election in 2008 the estimate has the “wrong” (not theoretically expected,
negative) sign, the People’s Party losing 0.7 percentage points on an increase in the rate
of income by one percentage point. For the remaining three elections (1999, 2002 and
2006), the People’s Party gained 3.6, 4.3 and 1.6 percentage points respectively, if the
growth rate of income rose by one percentage point.
In Table 4, the election function results are shown for the Social Democratic Party.
As the Social Democrats were in opposition in the 2002 and 2006 elections and in
government in 1999 and 2008, we have to consider this when interpreting these results.
For the 2002 election, we get the expected result: if unemployment rose by one
















































































Notes: (*), *, **, indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10, 5 and 1%
significance level respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding t-statistics of the estimated
parameters. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. D.F. = degrees of freedom; VP – Austrian People’s
Party. The People’s Party was in government over all four elections
Source: Statistics Austria, various years
a Result at the last election
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percentage point, the election outcome of the Social Democrats increased by 1.6
percentage points. If the growth rate of disposable income increased by 1 percentage
point, the Social Democrats in opposition lost 3.3 percentage points. However, the
same influence is indicated for 1999. Here we do not get the theoretically expected
signs, as the Social Democrats were in government and even had the federal chancellor.
For the elections in 2006 and 2008, the economic variables had no statistically
significant influence.
Finally, if we turn to the election results of the Freedom Party (Table 5), which was
in power in the elections in 2002 and 2006, we find a statistically significant and
theoretically expected sign for the unemployment variable for the elections in 2006 and
2008. If the rate of unemployment rose by one percentage point, the Freedom Party lost
0.48 percentage points in 2006. However, the growth rate of income has the “wrong”
(theoretically not expected) negative sign, meaning that if income rose by one percent-
age point, the Freedom Party lost 0.16 percentage points. For the elections in 2008 the
unemployment rate had a statistically significant negative influence. This is again the
“wrong” sign, meaning that if unemployment rose by one percentage point, the
Freedom Party (in opposition) lost 0.1 percentage points.
Summarizing the results of the separate estimations of the four election functions for
the three parties, we must admit that only considering the influence of economic
variables may lead to a misspecification of the estimated equations. In Tables 3 and
5, a first attempt is made to tackle this issue by also considering the influence of the
previous election (presented in the respective second line). If we first start with the
People’s Party, the results are shown in Table 3. The lagged endogenous variable
(outcome of the last election) has a statistically highly significant positive influence
on the result of subsequent elections in 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2008. If we turn to the
two economic variables (unemployment and income growth), we discover that unem-
ployment has a statistically significant influence with the theoretically predicted neg-
ative sign only for the election in 1999. If the unemployment rate rose by one











































Notes: (*), *, **, indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10, 5 and 1%
significance level respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding t-statistics of the estimated
parameters. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination; D.F. = degrees of freedom; SP – Social
Democratic Party Austria. The Social Democratic Party was in government before the 1999 and 2008
elections; for the elections in 2002 and 2006 they were in opposition
Source: Statistics Austria, various years
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percentage point, the People’s Party lost 0.68 percentage points in 1999. Likewise the
growth rate of disposable income has a statistically highly significant positive influence
(as theoretically expected) on all four election outcomes: if the growth rate of dispos-
able income rose by one percentage point, the People’s Party gained 1.3, 0.76, 0.2 and
0.13 percentage points in the elections in 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2008 respectively. It is
interesting to note that the quantitative influence of the income growth variable shrinks
considerably over these four elections from 1.3 percentage points in 1999 to only 0.13
percentage points in the election in 2008, but it is statistically highly significant in all
four elections.
Regarding the empirical results of the four elections for the Social Democrats (available
from the authors), we remind the reader that they were in opposition in 2002 and 2006 and
in power in 1999 and 2008. Only for the two elections in 2002 and 2006 do we find a
statistically significant influence of the independent variables, namely for unemployment in
2002 and for the growth rate of disposable income in 2006. In both cases, the economic
variables have the “wrong” signs, i.e. negative for unemployment and positive for inflation.
One would expect the opposite effect for an opposition party.
In Table 5, the estimations are presented for the election results of the Freedom Party.
Again, note that the Freedom Party was in opposition in the elections in 1999 and 2008 and
in government in the elections in 2002 and 2006. The two economic variables have the
theoretically predicted signs (for an opposition party) in the 1999 election: a positive


















































































Notes: (*), *, **, indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10, 5 and 1%
significance level respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding t-statistics of the estimated
parameters. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination; D.F. = degrees of freedom; FP – Freedom Party
Austria. The Freedom Party was in government in 2002 and 2006 and in opposition in 1999 and 2008
Source: Statistics Austria, various years
a Result at the last election
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influence for unemployment and a negative one for the growth rate of income. If
unemployment rose by one percentage point, the Freedom Party gained three percentage
points. If income rose by one percentage point, they lost 0.76 percentage points. In the
election in 2006, when the Freedom Party was in government, the two economic variables
again are statistically significant. If unemployment rose by one percentage point, the party
lost 0.5 percentage points, as predicted theoretically, but if income rose by one percentage
point they lost 0.2 percentage points, which is not the predicted sign. In the other cases, the
economic variables have no statistically significant influence. To summarize: If we include
the lagged dependent variable (the last election result) in order to take account of the ceteris
paribus condition, the economic variables have a statistically more significant influence
with the predicted signs in most cases.
Finally in Tables 6 and 7 an attempt is made to undertake panel estimations over all
four elections. Of course, this is only possible for the People’s Party as this was the only
one which was in government all of the time. In Table 6, a panel estimation random
effects (RE) method is shown including election dummies for 2002, 2006 and 2008.5
Ifwe consider the results inTable 6,wenotice that the election dummyvariables for 2002
and 2006 have a statistically significant influence. The two economic variables have the
predicted signs and are statistically highly significant. If the unemployment rate rose by one
percentage point, the election outcome of the People’s Party decreased by 0.46 percentage
points. If thegrowthrateofdisposable incomeincreasedbyonepercentagepoint, theelection
outcome of the People’s Party increased by 0.15 percentage points. These influences are
quantitatively not important, but they are statistically highly significant.
In Table 7, the results of a panel estimation using the lagged dependent variable (last
election outcome) and applying a FGLS6 regression are shown. In comparison to Table 6,
note that the growth rate of disposable income still has a statistically highly significant
influence which has increased in terms of quantitative importance, but the unemployment
variable is not statistically significant. If the growth rate of disposable income increased by
one percentage point, the election outcome of the People’s Party increased by 0.39 to 0.47
percentage points. This is a much larger influence when compared to the result in Table 6.
Summary and Conclusions
Summarizing the results of our paper, we find:
(1) With respect to the popularity functions of the Austrian parties at the federal level
over the period 1987–2010, we have to take into account that only the People’s
Party was in government all the time while the other parties examined switched
5 When the random effects estimation method is used, it is sometimes argued that this method generates a
quasi-differenced estimator. This is due to the fact that the generalized least squares (GSL) regression
delivering this random effect estimator within panel data is equivalent to ordinary least squares (OLS) using
quasi-demeaned data. In other words, from each estimator’s average, we subtract a fraction θ. Therefore, θ
needs to be calculated, which in turn requires estimates of the within and between variances. In general, if
assumptions are met, RE is efficient and consistent. In our model, the GLS estimator is the weighted average
of the between and within variance.
6 As it is very difficult to undertake a panel estimation using a lagged dependent variable, one possible tool is
the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), which explicitly computes an individual covariance matrix for
GLS each time instead of using an assumed one.
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from government to opposition and vice versa. If we consider the period where
the People’s Party dominated and the Freedom Party was the “junior” partner
(2000 to 2006), only the inflation rate had a statistically significant influence and
the theoretically predicted negative sign. For the Social Democrats, in opposition
at this point, the coefficient of the unemployment rate had the predicted positive
sign. It is statistically significant, as is the growth rate of disposable income,
which also has the theoretically predicted negative sign. For the junior coalition
party, the Freedom Party, we now get a statistically significant influence except for
the coefficient for the inflation rate, which has the wrong (positive) sign.
Considering the second period, when Austria had a “grand coalition” involving
the Social Democratic Party and the People’s Party, unemployment had a negative
influence as predicted theoretically which is statistically significant. We also find
for the Social Democrats, now back in government, that the growth rate of income
has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant. In general these
results show that the economic situation has some influence on the popularity of
the Austrian parties, but these results are mixed and are not stable.
(2) Turning to the influence of the economic situation on the election outcomes for
the Austrian parties in 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2008, we find for the People’s Party,
Table 6 Election function of the Austrian People’s Party in the elections in 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, Panel-

























0.358 0.965 5297.0 85
Notes: (*), *, **, indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10, 5 and 1%
significance level respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding t-statistics of the estimated
parameters. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination; D.F. = degrees of freedom
Source: Own calculations based on data from Statistics Austria, various years
Table 7 Election functions of the Austrian People’s Party in the elections in 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2008; with



































Notes: (*), *, **, indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10, 5 and 1%
significance level respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding t-statistics of the estimated
parameters. D.F. = degrees of freedom
Source: Statistics Austria, various years
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which was in government before and after these four elections, that unemploy-
ment has a statistically significant influence on their election outcomes in 2002,
2006 and 2008. Here the growth rate of income has a statistically significant
influence, but unfortunately with the “wrong” sign in the last election of 2008. In
general we find a declining influence of the growth rate of disposable income.
If one tries to take account of the ceteris paribus condition by including a
lagged dependent variable in the estimated functions, the unemployment variable
has the theoretically expected sign, but only in the 1999 election is this variable
statistically significant. In addition, the growth rate of disposable income is
statistically significant and has the theoretically expected sign for all four elec-
tions. Here, too, we find a declining influence of this economic variable. In a
panel estimation for the People’s Party over all four elections, both unemployment
and the growth rate of disposable income are statistically significant and have the
expected signs. For the other two parties, the influence of the economic variables
is mixed and in some cases we obtain the wrong sign.
What conclusions can we draw from these results?
(1) The economic situation does influence the popularity of the three Austrian parties
and the election outcomes of these parties at federal level to some extent.
However, the results for the popularity functions are mixed and the influence of
the economic variables is not robust. In the case of the election/vote functions, the
influence of the economic variables for the People’s Party, which was in govern-
ment in these four elections, is somewhat more stable, and except for one case, we
have the theoretically predicted sign for the unemployment rate and the growth
rate of disposable income.
(2) This instability may be caused by the Austrian political system and by the fact that
there were switching coalitions from the 1980s and 1990s to the present day. The
time period considered is not long enough to investigate possible economic
influences on these different types of coalitions in a thorough way.
(3) Similar to Kirchgässner’s results for Germany, it seems that the economic influences
on party popularity and election outcomes have beenweakening over the last decade.
However more thorough investigations are required to confirm this finding.
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